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Abstract
This study establishes the potential positive relationship between multimarket contact (MMC) and
sustainable collusive prots under demand uctuations. In particular, I focus on the correlation structure
between demand shocks over multiple markets and show how it can lead to a positive link between collusive
prot and MMC. Simple theoretical models show that, regardless of whether demand shocks are observable
or not, MMC may improve collusive prots through diversication of demand shocks over overlapping
markets. If rms meet in multiple markets and link those markets in the sense that deviation in any market
will trigger simultaneous retaliations in every market, then a cheating rm will optimally deviate in every
market. Demand uctuation that a rm is facing in its markets in total will be reduced as the number
of markets increases, unless demand shocks are perfectly and positively correlated between the markets.
The reduction of demand uctuations can boost collusion (1) by reducing the temptation to deviate in
the period of high demand when demand shocks are observable and (2) by reducing the frequency of
costly punishment on the equilibrium path when demand shock is unobservable. The conclusion in the
case of observable demand shock provides us with a new testable implication that price competition will
be muted by MMC in periods of high demand.
1 Introduction
When demand is uctuating, so is the sustainability of collusion. When demand shock is observable,
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) pointed out that a rm is more tempted to deviate from collusion in the
period of high demand because the immediate gain from deviation increases while the expected future
loss from it remains the same. When demand shock is unobservable, on the other hand, Green and Porter
(1984) argued that rms may enter into a non-collusive punishment phase when they observe low prot,
even though it is caused by low demand shock rather than by secrete cheating of some rms, due to the
lack of monitoring ability to distinguish deviation from low demand shock. These results suggest that
demand uctuations have a negative relationship with the level of sustainable collusive prots.
When rms meet with each other in more than a single market, that is, when rms have multimarket
contacts (MMC), it may make a di¤erence in a competitive environment and lead to a new implication
on collusion as compared to a single market setting. This study investigates how MMC can a¤ect the
sustainability of collusive outcome under demand uctuations. In particular, we propose a possible
mechanism in which MMC boosts the sustainable collusive prots when rms face stochastic demand
shocks using the model of repeated games. The short conclusion is that, regardless of whether demand
shocks are observable or not, multimarket contacts may improve collusive prots through diversication of
demand shocks across the markets, when rms link the overlapping markets in the sense that a deviation in
a market will trigger retaliations in all overlapping markets. Less demand uctuations from diversication
may facilitate collusion (1) by reducing the temptation to deviate in the period of high demand when
aggregate demand shock is observable and (2) by reducing the frequency of costly punishment on the
equilibrium path when aggregate demand shock is unobservable.
Collusion will break down when the expected gain from deviation is higher than that from collusion.
This relationship is clear to see when demand shock is observable as a rm can tell when the best time
to deviate is: a cheating rm will deviate when the realized demand is at a peak. If rival rms are
meeting with each other in multiple markets and they engage in linking strategy, in which a deviation in
a single market triggers simultaneous punishments in all overlapping markets, then the best opportunity
to deviate would be those times when demand shock is the highest in every overlapping market. Note
that, as the number of overlapping markets gets larger, the demand uctuation of all overlapping markets
combined will get smaller unless the demand shocks are perfectly and positively correlated. In other
words, a common high demand shock in every market is unlikely. It is likely that some overlapping
markets experience a negative demand shock. In this sense, MMC may lead to a higher sustainable
collusive prot as rms can take advantage of diversication of demand shocks by linking the overlapping
markets.
When demand shock is unobservable, monitoring is imperfect. The knowledge of correlation strucutre
between demand shocks can be useful for rms to detect cheating. Although individual market outcomes
may not be informative, the prole of outcomes across overlapping markets could be informative. Note
that, if rms are meeting in multiple markets and a rm decides to deviate, the rm will optimally deviate
in every market. This is because the markets are linked to the extent that deviation in any market triggers
simultaneous retaliations in all the markets. Then, cheating will a¤ect all overlapping markets and rms
can have a better sense of whether some rms have deviated or not by looking at the prole of prots
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across overlapping markets. Better monitoring can lead to higher collusive prots.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce related literatures and highlight
my contributions. In Section 3, theoretical models will be described to show the potential positive impact
of multimarket contacts on collusion under stochastic demand shocks and the possible extension of the
model will be discussed. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Bernheim and Whinston (1990) show that MMC may facilitate collusion by pooling incentive constraints
and transferring the slacks in the constraints between markets. They emphasize the asymmetry between
markets or rival rms as a source of positive MMC e¤ect on collusion. Adding stochastic demand shocks
to their story provides us with another implication on the link between MMC and collusion through
diversication e¤ect.
Diversication is often regarded to have two di¤erent but related economic e¤ects. On the one hand,
a rm may operate in multiple markets in which the tasks are unrelated or products are heterogeneous.
In this case, diversied tasks or products may have a positive impact on a rms performance through
the economies of scope. On the other hand, diversication can indicate that market outcomes such as
prots and returns are unrelated or negatively correlated between the markets. In this sense, the role
of diversication is the reduction of risk or uctuation of rm performance, similarly with that investors
reduce the risk of investment for the same expected return by diversifying a portfolio in nance. The role
of diversication as a mean to enjoy the economy of scope has been raised in several studies on collusion
and MMC. The reduction of risk by diversication, however, has not been emphasized in pervious works
on the topic and this role will be the focus of this study.
The link between diversication and collusion through MMC was noted by Hughes and Oughton
(1993). However, their work is limited in the sense that diversication induces a higher collusive prot
simply because it extends the chances for rms to meet with each other and thereby increases rms
mutual recognition of interdependence. In other words, when rms are diversied in terms of product
lines or operations, it is more likely for them to meet with each other, which in turn will lead the rms
to know each other better and not to compete hard against each other. Their work does not address
the direct role of diversication in collusion. Rather, it argues that diversied rms tend to have more
MMC and hence higher collusive prots. This study shows that rms with more MMC tend to be more
diversied and diversication has a direct (positive) e¤ect on the sustainable collusive prots by reducing
demand uctuations.
Marketing literatures take a di¤erent approach on the link between diversication and MMC. Similarly
with Hughes and Oughton, they note that "diversication and multimarket contact are complementary
activities because the former provides the opportunity for the latter" (Li and Greenwood, 2004). In addi-
tion, since diversication usually involves the economy of scope, it can lead to a higher prot. Basically,
they argue that diversication tends to lead to MMC and hence the e¤ect of MMC on prots will include
the benet from diversication which arises from the economy of scope, although it is not specic to
collusion, resulting in the pattern of higher prots under MMC. As in Hughes and Oughton, however,
this argument does not present the direct e¤ect of diversication on collusion with MMC.
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When it comes to the markets with stochastic demand shocks, diversication can o¤er an additional
channel in which MMC may a¤ect collusive outcome. In particular, the reduction of demand uctuations
through diversication of demand shocks across overlapping markets, combined with linking strategy
(which involves simultaneous retaliations in multiple markets), may have a direct e¤ect on collusive
prots. This idea of linking the e¤ect of diversication on the expected collusive prots under stochastic
demand shock is new.
Now, lets think about how demand uctuation can a¤ect collusion. The link between stochastic
demand shock and collusion can be found in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Green and Porter (1984).
The both works have the same implication that demand uctuations can undermine collusion. However,
the situations in which the uctuations undermine collusion are di¤erent due to di¤erent assumptions on
the characteristics of demand shock.
Rotemberg and Saloner assume an "observable" demand shock and conclude that rms are more
tempted to deviate from collusion when demand shock is positive, implying more competition in the period
of high demand. This is because the immediate gains from deviation increases while the future prots lost
during punishment phase remains the same. In contrast, Green and Porter assume an "unobservable"
demand shock and conclude that a price war is more likely to occur when demand is low. Note that
demand uctuations are not observed directly by rms in their setting. Thus, a low prot can occur
either due to negative demand shock or from secrete cheating by some rms. As a result, rms trigger
a price war when demand is lower than a certain level, even when no one has actually deviated, in the
equilibrium path of collusion.
Applying the two works to a MMC setting provides us with a new perspective on the e¤ect of MMC on
collusion under demand uctuations. If rival rms link the overlapping markets in the sense a deviation
in any overlapping market will trigger simultaneous retaliations in every market, a cheating rm will
optimally deviate in every market. Note that, unless demand shocks are perfectly and positively correlated
between markets, the average demand uctuations will be reduced as the number of markets increases.
The reduction of demand uctuations from MMC implies that (1) the best opportunity to deviate, i.e.
high demand shock in every market, will come less often when demand shock is observable while (2)
the probability of low demand shock in at least one market, i.e. the likelihood of triggering a price war
even without cheating, rises, which is basically same as the "risk of contagion" noted by Thomas and
Willig (2006). In this sense, MMC and diversication from linking the overlapping markets may facilitate
collusion when demand shock is observable but not when it is unobservable.
Thomas and Willig focused on the strategy that links the risky front where demand shock is unob-
servable to the safe front where there is no variation in demand. Linking strategy may rather reduce
the playerspayo¤s because it permits negative demand shocks to spread from the risky front to the safe
front. Even though collusion used to be sustainable only in the safe front and linking might enable rms
to collude in the risky front as well, the reduced (or sacriced) prot in the safe front might exceed the
prot from the collusion in the risky front.
If we consider the strategy that links the risky front to another risky front, instead of the safe front,
so that a low prot in any front triggers a price war in both fronts, then the linkage will always make
collusion less attractive because a price war is more likely to be triggered unless the shocks are perfectly
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and positively correlated. In this sense, diversication can amplify the "risk of contagion" from linking
strategy. The more markets rms are meeting, the more likely is that demand shock is negative in at
least one market, which results in a higher frequency of a price war and a lower expected collusive prot.
Thus, diversication may hurt collusion by raising the type 1 error, given the number of market contacts.
The risk of contagion, however, can be overstated given the trigger strategy that does not take into
account the number of overlapping markets and the correlation structure of demand shocks between the
markets. So far, we have implicitly assumed that a trigger event is the same regardless of the number
of market contacts or the degree of diversication; a rm will enter into the punishment phase if the
realized prot is lower than a certain level in any of the overlapping markets. However, rms will take
advantage of their knowledge of the correlation structure of demand shocks in order to set an optimal
trigger strategy.
Matsushima (2001) argued that extensive MMC enhances monitoring ability and rms adjust their
trigger strategies and thereby improves the expected collusive prots. In particular, he assumed inde-
pendent and identical demand shocks across markets. Then rms can adjust trigger events such as the
accumulation of low prots in more than a certain number of markets. This trigger strategy will make
monitoring perfect since the number of markets with a low demand will not exceed a certain level as the
number of market contacts increases by the law of large numbers.
Diversication may amplify the benet from better specication of trigger events because the knowl-
edge of the correlation structure of demand shocks between markets can provide a more scope that rms
can use in setting trigger events, even without an innitely many number of market contacts. That
is, even with only two market contacts, if rms know how the demand shocks are correlated between
the two markets, they can set a better trigger event based on the joint probability of realized market
outcomes derived from the correlation structure. Although a single market outcome may not have any
information about other rmsactions, the distribution of outcomes across the overlapping markets may
be informative.
For example, rms can optimally adjust trigger events so that they enter into the punishment phase if
the prole of prots across the markets becomes much more likely when cheating has occurred than when
other rms have been cooperative. Under this trigger strategy, a cheating rm cannot optimally deviate
in every market because it will increase the probability of getting caught signicantly when markets are
diversied. That is, the new trigger strategy reduces the number of markets that a cheating rm can
protably deviate and so the immediate gain from deviation, which will curb the temptation to deviate.
In this way, rms can actually benet from reduced demand uctuations because the frequency of trigger
events will decrease when the markets are diversied, as in the case of observable demand shock. Therefore,
rms can better distinguish cheating from negative demand shocks, implying the lower the probability
of rejecting the idea that all rms are cooperative (Type I error1) and higher expected collusive prots.
Moreover, this improvement in monitoring is even larger when markets are diversied and the correlation
structure is known than demand shocks are independent as in Matsushima, given the number of market
1There are two types of errors that can be made when testing the statistical signicance of estimates. When a null
hypothesis is erroneously rejected, it is called a Type I error. When a null hypothesis is erroneously accepted, it is called a
Type II error. Here, a null hypothesis is that all rms were cooperative while an alternative hypothesis is that some rms
deviated from collusion. When the null hypothesis is rejected, a price war is triggered.
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contacts.
Note that there are two forces of diversication that a¤ect the Type I error in opposite directions.
One is the increased probability of low demand at least in one market given a trigger event, which raises
the Type I error, and the other is the better specication of a trigger event, which lowers the Type I error.
It is noteworthy that diversication under linking strategy when demand shock is unobservable amplies
both the risk of contagion and the benets from better specication of trigger events. However, if rms
know how demand shocks are correlated between the markets, they can reduce the risk of contagion by
setting optimal trigger events and hence benet from diversication. Thus, MMC may facilitate collusion
through diversication if rms know the correlation structure of demand shocks between the markets.
In sum, regardless of whether demand shocks are observable of not, MMCmay improve collusive prots
through diversication. In particular, diversication aids collusion (1) by creating asymmetry between
markets when demand shock is observable and (2) by providing informational advantage in monitoring
when demand shock is unobservable.
3 Model
In this section, we will develop simple theoretical models using repeated games. The analyses follow the
traditional game theoretical analysis, and the possible extension of the model will be discussed.
First of all, let me dene the observability of demand shocks. Either if rms make a price decision
after they know the realized demand or if rms can predict demand and make a decision based on the
prediction, demand shocks are regarded as observableby the rms in the market. In contrast, if demand
shock is not directly observed by rms neither before nor after their price decision, it is thought of as
unobservablein the market.
The observability of demand shock matters when rms are coordinating their actions. Under ob-
servable demand shock, the temptation to deviate in the period of high demand is most likely to make
a binding constraint for collusion. Under unobservable demand shock, imperfect monitoring raised by
rmsinability to distinguish cheating from negative demand shock is the obstacle in collusion. In the
following sections, whether and how diversication may alleviate these problems will be studied in each
case. The basic models follow the traditional game theoretical analysis but the possible extension of the
model will be discussed later in the section.
3.1 Observable Demand Shock
In this section, we will present a basic model that suggests that MMC may mute price competition and
improve sustainable collusive prots especially in the period of high demand, through diversication of
demand shocks between overlapping markets. That is, the more the overlapping markets are diversied
in demand shocks, the higher the sustainable prots are for rms participating in collusion.
Key intuition is that good chances to cheat will come less often when rms are linking the diversied
overlapping markets. In particular, when markets are linked strategically in the sense that a deviation
in any market will trigger the same massive punishment in multiple markets, a rm will deviate in every
market once it decides to cheat. Then it would be the best for the rm to deviate when demand is high
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in every market. If the linked markets are diversied, however, when demand is high in some markets,
demand will be low in other markets, meaning that the immediate gain from deviation is reduced.
The intuition has the same avor as Bernheim and Whinstons theory. Here, the source of asymmetry
comes from statistically di¤erent realization of demand shocks between markets. When markets are
diversied in terms of demand shocks, there will be slack in incentive constraints in some markets in
general and so rms can transfer the slacks to the other markets where the incentive constraint is binding,
although the markets in which rms have slack in the incentive constraint will be di¤erent from time to
time depending on the realized demand shocks. So, the source of asymmetry is diversication of demand
shocks across the markets.
First of all, let us assume the followings:
(A1) There exist two identical rms competing in two duopoly markets M1 and M2, without product
di¤erentiation. The markets open simultaneously and repeatedly.
(A2) "i is a random demand shock in market i. Demand shock is realized to be either high(when
" = "H) or low(when " = "L) with equal probability (=0.5) in each market. The demand shocks are
independently and identically distributed over time but may be correlated between the markets. So, in
each period, the distribution of random demand shock in the two markets is
" =
"H with prob. = 0.5
"L with prob. = 0.5
(A3) M (") is dened as a rms payo¤ from joint prot maximization (as if the two rms are
maximizing one monopoly prot) when demand shock " is realized. For notational simplicity, ML 
M ("L), MH  M ("H). Assume 0 < ML < MH . S(") is the highest sustainable collusive prot given
demand shock ".
(A4) Decision variable is price and rms decide their own price based on the observation of demand
shock in each period.
(A5)  2 (0; 1) is a discount factor common to the two rms.
(A6) Firms payo¤ can be any value from zero to innity.
Let us consider the case where the rms employ a grim trigger strategy in which they revert to the Nash
Bertrand competition (meaning zero prots) forever once any rm defects. When it comes to observable
demand shocks, punishment will not be realized in the equilibrium path of collusion. So, the severer is the
punishment, the higher is the sustainable collusive prots. In this sense, the Nash Bertrand competition
is the optimal choice for rms in the punishment phase. Under the grim trigger strategy, the loss from
deviation is the present value of the expected future collusive prots (= 1 E[
S(")]).
We will begin with the benchmark case in which rms do not link the markets. That is, a defect in
one market will lead to punishment only in that specic market and will not a¤ect the other market.
Then the collusive prot when a linking strategy is employed by the rms will be explored and compared
to the benchmark result, under di¤erent correlation structures of demand shocks between the markets.
[Benchmark Case] Assume a separating strategy; rms maximize prot in each market separately.
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If taken separately, the two markets can be viewed as identical. So, looking at one market is su¢ cient.
In a single market, joint prot maximization is sustainable if
Mi 

1  E[
S(")]
where i = H or L. The LHS is the immediate gain from deviation and the RHS is the future loss from
deviation (i.e. the present value of the expected sustainable prots in the future).
If the joint prot maximizing prot is sustainable regardless of the realization of demand shock, i.e.
S(") =
MH if " = "H
ML if " = "L
then the loss from deviation will be

1  E[
S(")] =

1   
S("H) + 
S("L)
2
=

1   
MH +
M
L
2
.
That is, rms can maximize the joint prot in any state of demand if
(ML <) 
M
H 

1  E[
S(")] =

1   
MH +
M
L
2
 !   
1   
2MH
MH +
M
L
(1)
On the other hand, for a lower discount factor  with which (1) does not hold, the joint prot-
maximizing prot may be sustainable only when demand is low because the immediate gain from deviation
is larger in the period of high demand (ML < 
M
H ). Then the rms have to settle for lower prot than 
M
H
in the period of high demand. In particular, the highest sustainable prot in the period of high demand
( SBM ) must satisfy the following condition:
SBM =

1  E[
S(")] =

1   
S("H) + 
S("L)
2
=

1   
SBM +
M
L
2
! SBM =

2  
M
L
provided  < 2 (otherwise, (1) holds, meaning that MH is sustainable, which is contradictory). In
addition,
ML 

1  E[
S(")] = SBM < 
M
H
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Figure 1: Regions of Sustainable Collusive Prots under Observable Demand Shock
This implies that rms can sustain joint prot maximization in the period of low demand shock
(= ML ), but they can sustain only as high as 
S
BM in the period of high demand shock. Then
ML 

2  
M
L < 
M
H
 ! 1    
1   <
2MH
MH +
M
L
Therefore, for  such that 1  1  <
2MH
MH +
M
L
, the highest sustainable prot is
S(") =
SBM =

2 
M
L if " = "H
ML if " = "L
Figure 1 summarizes the results. Moving from the left to the right on the horizontal line,  increases.
Note that  is dened as 1  and it is increasing in . Joint prot maximization is sustainable regardless of
the realization of demand shock as long as  is in Region B of Figure 1. On the other hand, SBM (< 
M
H )
is the highest sustainable level of prot in the period of high demand if  is in Region A of Figure 1.
It is noteworthy that the higher is MH than 
M
L (i.e. the higher "H is than "L), the larger is Region A.
This implies that sustainable collusive prot will be reduced as the degree of demand uctuation increases.
Now, let us turn to the cases where rms are linking the two markets in various situations in terms
of the correlation of demand shocks between the markets. In particular, we will compare the cases
where the demand shocks are perfectly and negatively correlated, perfectly and positively correlated, and
independent of each other, to the benchmark case in order to see the e¤ect of linking the markets under
demand uctuations.
[Case 1] Assume "1 and "2 are perfectly and negatively correlated.
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When rms are linking the two markets, they consider the prole of realized demand shocks in the
both markets, i.e. ("1; "2). The probability density function of ("1; "2), f("1; "2) is dened as follows:
f("1; "2) =
0:5 if ("1; "2) = ("H ; "L) or ("L; "H)
0 otherwise
Since we assume the markets are identical except for the realization of demand shock, the incentive
constraint not to deviate is the same in the two cases ("H ; "L) or ("L; "H). Note that the immediate gain
from deviation is the same in both cases. In addition, only these two cases take place with a positive
probability. Thus, what we need to consider is one of the two cases. Demand uctuations disappear as
the total demand shock (= "H + "L) does not vary over time.
By linking the markets in the sense a cheating in any market triggers punishment in every overlapping
market, rms are pooling the incentive constraints not to deviate. So, the incentive constraint for collusion
in the both markets when ("H ; "L) (or ("L; "H)) is
MH +
M
L 

1  E[
S(")] =

1   (
M
H +
M
L )
 !   
1    1
Note that joint prot maximization is now possible for both Region A and Region B in the Figure 1.
Therefore, when 1  is in Region A, the joint-prot maximizing prot is sustainable even in the period of
high demand with linking strategy, which cannot be sustained with separating strategy. This shows the
possibility that MMC mute price competition and improve the expected collusive prots in the period of
high demand.
[CASE 2] Assume "1 and "2 are perfectly and positively correlated.
The probability density function of ("1; "2), f("1; "2) is dened as follows:
f("1; "2) =
0:5 if ("1; "2) = ("H ; "H) or ("L; "L)
0 otherwise
Firms can sustain joint prot maximization in any state of demand if
(2ML < ) 2
M
H 

1  E[
S(")] =

1   
2MH + 2
M
L
2
 !   
1   
2MH
MH +
M
L
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This condition is exactly the same as in the benchmark case. Also as in the benchmark case, for a
lower discount factor that does not satisfy (1), it can be the case that rms are able to sustain joint prot
maximization only in the period of low demand in the both markets. In this case, the highest sustainable
prot in the period of high demand in the both markets is lower than the joint prot maximizing prot.
The highest sustainable prot in the two markets combined ( STotal("1; "2)) must satisfy
STotal("H ; "H) =

1  E[
S("1; "2)] =

1   
S("H ; "H) + 
S("L; "L)
2
=

1   
STotal("H ; "H) + 2
M
L
2
! STotal("H ; "H) =
2
2  
M
L
when demand is high (i.e. ("1; "2) = ("H ; "H)) in both markets. Note that STotal("H ; "H) = 2
S
BM ,
meaning that the incentive constraint is the same as in benchmark case, again.
In sum, when demand shocks are perfectly and positively correlated between markets, another market
is nothing but a replication of the same market and linking these markets is irrelevant to collusive prots.
[CASE 3] Assume "1 and "2 are independent of each other.
The probability density function of ("1; "2), f("1; "2) is dened as follows:
f("1; "2) =
0:25 if ("1; "2) = ("H ; "H); ("H ; "L); ("L; "H); or ("L; "L)
0 otherwise
As in case 2, joint prot maximization is always possible regardless of the realization of demand shocks
if
(2ML < 
M
H +
M
L <) 2
M
H 

1   
2ML + 2
M
H + (
M
L +
M
H ) + (
M
H +
M
L )
4
=
MH +
M
L
2
This is the same condition as in the benchmark case (and Case 2).
For a lower discount factor which does not satisfy (1), rms may not be able to sustain joint prot
maximization when demand is high in the both markets. When demand is high in both markets, the
highest sustainable prot (= STotal("H ; "H) ) satises
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STotal("H ; "H) =

1  E[
S("1; "2)]
=

1   
2ML +
S
Total("H ; "H) + (
M
L +
M
H ) + (
M
H +
M
L )
4
=

1   
2MH +
S
Total("H ; "H) + 4
M
L
4
! STotal("H ; "H) =
2
4  (
M
H + 2
M
L )
and
MH +
M
L  STotal("H ; "H)  2MH
 ! 4(
M
H +
M
L )
3MH + 5
M
L
   2
M
H
MH +
M
L
That is, for  such that 4(
M
H +
M
L )
3MH +5
M
L
 1  
2MH
MH +
M
L
, joint prot maximization is not sustainable when
demand is high in both markets. In this case, the highest sustainable prot is
STotal("1; "2) =
2
4 (
M
H + 2
M
L ) if ("1; "2) = ("H ; "H)
MH +
M
L if ("1; "2) = ("H ; "L) or ("L; "H)
2ML if ("1; "2) = ("L; "L)
For an even lower discount factor, rms may not be able to sustain joint prot maximization when
demand is high at least in one of the two markets. When demand is high in at least one of the markets,
the highest sustainable prot (STotal("H ; ))2 satises
STotal("H ; ) =

1  E[
S("1; "2)]
=

1   
2ML +
S
Total("H ; "L) + 
S
Total("H ; "L) + 
S
Total("H ; "L)
4
=

1   
2ML + 3
S
Total("H ; "L)
4
! STotal("H ; ) =
2
4  3
M
L
2 In this case, STotal("H ; "H) = 
S
Total("H ; "L) = 
S
Total("L; "H). Thus, the highest sustainable prot can be expressed as
either STotal("H ; ) or as STotal(; "H). Here, without loss of generality, we will use STotal("H ; ).
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and
2ML  STotal("H ; )  MH +ML
 ! 4(
M
H +
M
L )
3MH + 5
M
L
   2
M
H
MH +
M
L
That is, for  such that 1  1  
4(MH +
M
L )
3MH +5
M
L
, joint prot maximization is not sustainable when
demand is high in at least one market. In this case, the highest sustainable prot is
STotal("1; "2) =
2
4 3
M
L if ("1; "2) = ("H ; "H)
2ML if ("1; "2) = ("H ; "L) or ("L; "H)
In sum, for a low discount factor with which joint prot maximization is not sustainable if the over-
lapping markets are taken separately, i.e.  = 1  
2MH
MH +
M
L
, rms can improve their expected prots
by linking the two markets. In particular, when a discount factor,  is in Region C of Figure 1 (i.e.
4(MH +
M
L )
3MH +5
M
L
 1  
2MH
MH +
M
L
), a high demand shock in an overlapping market will trigger a price war in
the market under separating strategy while rms will be able to sustain joint prot maximization in the
market under linking strategy. Although joint prot maximization is not sustainable even with linking
strategy if demand shocks are high in both markets, collusion does not break up under a single market
high demand shock in this case. When a discount factor is lower so that it falls into Region D of Figure 1
(i.e. 1  1  
4(MH +
M
L )
3MH +5
M
L
), on the other hand, joint prot maximization is not sustainable when demand
shock is high at least in one market. However, rms can sustain a higher collusive prot under high
demand shock when they link the markets. That is, the highest sustainable prot is still higher when
linking the markets than taking them separately as STotal("1; ) = 24 3ML > 22 ML = 2SBM .3 This
implies that, if MMC leads to diversication, then diversication reduces the probability of the realization
of high demand in the both markets, which is the best opportunity to deviate, and thereby improves the
expected collusive prots.
Table 2.1. summarizes the results. Separating strategy implies that rms take each market separately.
Linking strategy, on the other hand, means that rms pool the incentive constraints in all overlapping
markets. Thus, the di¤erence between separating and linking strategies represent the e¤ect of MMC on
collusion. When a discount factor is high enough (Region B), then rms can maximize joint prots in
any state of demand regardless of MMC. When a discount factor is lower (Region A), then MMC make
di¤erences in the period of high demand unless demand shocks are perfectly and positively correlated
between the markets (Case 2:  = 1). In particular, when demand shocks are perfectly and negatively
correlated between the markets (Case 1:  =  1), joint prot maximization is sustainable with linking
strategy. When demand shocks are uncorrelated (Case 3:  = 1), we can see that linking strategy leads
to higher sustainable prots in the period of high demand. That is, incentive to deviate in those periods
is reduced and collusion becomes easier to sustain.
3This equation holds because  = 
1   1.
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Table 2.1. Highest Sustainable Collusive Prots
Range of Discount Factor
Correl. Realized Region A Region B
Structure Shocks Separating Linking Separating Linking
("1; "2) Region D Region C
Case 1 ("H ; "L)

2 
M
L +
M
L 
M
H+
M
L 
M
H+
M
L 
M
H+
M
L
( =  1)
Case 3 ("H ; "H)
2
2 
M
L
2
4 (
M
H+2
M
L ) 2
M
H 2
M
H
( = 0) ("H ; "L)

2 
M
L +
M
L
2
4 3
M
L 
M
H+
M
L 
M
H+
M
L 
M
H+
M
L
("L; "L) 2
M
L 2
M
L 2
M
L 2
M
L
Case 2 ("H ; "H)
2
2 
M
L
2
2 
M
L 2
M
H 2
M
H
( = 1) ("L; "L) 2
M
L 2
M
L 2
M
L 2
M
L
Region A: 1  1  
2MH
MH +
M
L
, Region B ( 1  
2MH
MH +
M
L
)
Region C:
4(MH +
M
L )
3MH +5
M
L
 1  
2MH
MH +
M
L
, Region D: 1  1  
4(MH +
M
L )
3MH +5
M
L
 is the correlation of demand shocks between the two overlapping marketsM1 and M2.
Since the two overlapping marketsM1 and M2 are symmetric,
("H ; "L) and ("L; "H) are essentially the same case.
In conclusion, unless the demand shocks are perfectly and positively correlated, the expected prot of
collusion in each market in the period of high demand is higher as compared to the benchmark case where
markets are not linked strategically. Notice that, when markets are perfectly and positively correlated, it
is merely a replication of the same market where the irrelevance result noted by Bernheim and Whinston
applies. In the real world, the probability of perfect positive correlation of demand shocks between markets
is practically zero. So, if rms are operating in several overlapping markets in which demand shocks are
imperfectly correlated, they may be able to sustain joint prot maximization in a market where demand
is high by linking the market to the other overlapping markets where demand is low.
3.2 Unobservable Demand Shock
The assumptions are similar with those in the case of observable demand shocks, except that (1) rms
cannot observe demand shocks directly and observe only their own prot which is the result of realized
demand shocks and rmsactions combined, and (2) when some rms cheated, innocent rms will have
the same low prot as in the period of low demand, that is, monitoring is imperfect. These di¤erences,
unobservability and imperfect monitoring change the implication of MMC and diversication in collusion.
The key ingredients of the model that a¤ect the result are the risk of contagion4 and the specication
4The term "risk of contagion" is used in Thomas and Willig (2006).
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of a trigger event. These two factors do not show up in the analysis when demand shock is observable
because there is no probability that low demand is misconstrued as cheating and moreover a rm can
detect cheating for sure if it has occurred. When demand shock is unobservable, punishment is triggered
by not only deviation but also low demand in order to reduce the incentive to deviate and sustain collusion.
Given a xed trigger event, this costly punishment will take place more often under more market contacts.
However, the trigger event is chosen from some optimization problem, meaning that the number of markets
and the joint distribution of demand shocks in the markets become arguments for the trigger level. Then,
more markets do not necessarily induce higher probability of mistakes and diversication may improve a
rms ability to infer a rival rms action and lead to better specication of trigger events. Let me begin
the model with the following assumptions:
(A1) There exist two identical rms competing in two duopoly markets M1 and M2. The markets
open simultaneously and repeatedly.
(A2) "i is a random demand shock in market i. Demand shock is realized to be either high(when
" = "H) or low(when " = "L) with equal probability (=0.5) in each market. The demand shocks are
independently and identically distributed over time but may be correlated between the markets. So, in
each period, the distribution of random demand shock in the two markets is
" =
"H with prob. = 0.5
"L with prob. = 0.5
(A3) The payo¤ matrix for rms when demand is high, i.e. " = "H , depends on the combination of
actions of the two rms as follows:
Firm 2
Cooperate Defect
Firm 1 Cooperate (H ;H) (L;H + k)
Defect (H + k;L) (H  m;H  m)
where 0 < k  H and 0 < m < H   L. Meanwhile, when demand shock is low, the payo¤ for a
rm does not depend on its action. That is, rms cannot distinguish cheating from low demand shock.
In particular, regardless of a rms action, the prot is L when demand shock is low. This assumption
implies imperfect monitoring.
(A4) Firms set their prices without knowledge of the state of demand in each period.
(A5)  2 (0; 1) is a discount factor common to the two rms.
First of all, let us consider a trigger strategy that rms enter into a punishment phase forever from
the next period when they observe in any market. Since there is possibility that rms trigger a price war
erroneously due to imperfect monitoring, the punishment phase should be nite. Instead, we assume a
low discount factor.
[Benchmark Case] Assume a separating strategy; rms maximize prot in each market separately.
If taken separately, rms will be able to sustain collusion in each market if
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H +L
2
+ 
VC + VP
2
 (H + k) + L
2
+ VP (2)
where VC is the value in a collusion phase and VP is the value in a punishment phase. In each side, the rst
term is the expected prot today and the second term is the present value of the play starting tomorrow.
The left hand side (LHS) is the total expected prot when being cooperative in this period. The right hand
side (RHS) is the total expected prot when cheating in this period. Firms will experience either high
demand shock or low demand shock with the same probability, the expected prot. So, the expected prot
for the current period will be H+L2 when being cooperative and
(H+k)+L
2 when cheating. In the next
period, rms will enter into a punishment phase with probability .5 even when they have been cooperative
because low demand shock will be regarded as the sign of secret cheating. Meanwhile, collusion will break
down for certain if cheating has occurred. Thus, the present value of the play starting tomorrow is  VC+VP2
when being cooperative and VP when cheating.
If the value of collusion is stable over time, the LHS is the value of collusion (= VC) and the RHS
is the value of deviation. In addition, the optimal punishment will satisfy equation (2) with an exact
equality. Therefore, VC =
H+L k
2(1 ) (and VP = VC   1k).
Now, turn to the multiple market cases where rms trigger a price war based on their own prots in
the two markets together.
[Case 1] Assume "1 and "2 are perfectly and negatively correlated.
First of all, if rms enter into a punishment phase when they observe low prot in any of the two
markets, rms will always become to be in a punishment phase because they will observe low prot in at
least one market. So, rmsincentive constraint not to deviate is
H +L + VC  (H + k) + L + VP
which is not sustainable as long as k > 0. That is, collusion is impossible because low demand in one
market hurts collusion not only in that market but also the other market where demand is high. This
illustrates the risk of contagionnoted by Thomas and Willig (2006). Because the negative demand shock
in one market spreads its e¤ect to the other market with positive demand shock, linking the markets can
be even worse than separating the markets.
However, if rms know the correlation structure of demand shocks between the markets, they can
adjust a trigger strategy optimally based on the information. In particular, consider the case where a
rm triggers punishment if the rm observes a pair of its own prots in the two markets, (1;2) s.t.
(1;2) = ArgmaxPr f(1;2)jDg   Pr f(1;2)jCg, where D and C stand for other rm deviated
and other rm was cooperative, respectively, when I was cooperative. Intuitively, it will be optimal for
a rm to punish the other rm if the rms prots in the two markets are much more likely to be realized
when the other rm cheated than when the other rm was cooperative. So, a rm can specify a better
trigger event than a simple strategy that triggers punishment when it observed low prot in any of the
two markets, based on the increase in probability of a pair of its own prots when the other rm cheated.
15
When the demand shocks are perfectly and negatively correlated, the pair of prots in the two markets
for an innocent rm is either (H ;L) or (L;H) with equal probability if the other rm has also been
cooperative, but it is (L;L) for certain if the other rm has deviated in the both markets. So, for each
possible pair of prots of an innocent rm in the two markets, the change in probability is as follows:
Pr f(1;2)jDg   Pr f(1;2)jCg =
0  :5 =  :5 if (1;2) = (H ;L) or (L;H)
0  0 = 0 if (1;2) = (H ;H)
1  0 = 1 if (1;2) = (L;L)
Based on the change in probability of (1;2) when some rm deviated as compared to when all rms
cooperated, a rm will adjust a trigger event so that it starts retaliations in every market if it observed
low prot in every market because it can happen only when the other rm deviated in the both markets.
In this case, the incentive constraint not to deviate becomes
H +L + VC  (H + k) + L + VP
Note that punishment no longer occurs in the equilibrium path of collusion (so VP does not appear
in the LHS). So the optimal choice of punishment will be as harsh as possible. That is, VP = 0 (perfect
competition). The value of collusion is now VC =
H+L
1  , and the collusion is sustainable if

1  (H +
L)  k. The value of collusion is larger than the value of collusion when markets are taken separately
(= H+L k1  ).
However, knowing that it will be punished only when low prots are realized in the both markets, a
cheating rm might decide to deviate in only one of the markets in order to reduce the probability of
getting caught although it will reduce the immediate gains from deviation. Without loss of generality,
lets assume that a rm will cheat inM1 if it decides to deviate. Then, an innocent rm will get (L;H)
if demand happens to be low in M1 (and high in M2) and (L;L) if demand happens to be low in M2
(and high in M1), both with probability 0.5. So, for each possible pair of prots of an innocent rm in
the two markets, the change in probability is now
Pr f(1;2)jDg   Pr f(1;2)jCg =
:5  :25 = :25 if (1;2) = (L;H)
0  :25 =  :25 if (1;2) = (H ;L)
0  0 = 0 if (1;2) = (H ;H)
:5  0 = :5 if (1;2) = (L;L)
Again, the biggest change in probability happens for the cases where low prot is realized in the both
markets. So, a trigger strategy is the same as before and the incentive constraint not to deviate becomes
H +L + VC  (L +H) + ((H + k) + L)
2
+ 
VP + VC
2
Note that punishment does not take place on the equilibrium path but, at the same time, cheating
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may not be caught by an innocent rm. The optimal punishment and the value of collusion are the same
as before, i.e. VP = 0; VC =
H+L
1  . In addition, the condition for sustainable collusion is the same as
well, i.e. 1  (H + L)  k. Thus, the optimal trigger event will be that low prot is realized in every
market and, if a rm observes this trigger event, it will enter into a punishment phase where rms are in
perfect competition.
Therefore, for any deviation strategy, rms can improve their collusive prots by adjusting a trigger
event based on how much the distribution of realized prots is more likely when there has been cheating
compared to when there has not. Moreover, if the overlapping markets are perfectly diversied, that is,
perfectly and negatively correlated in terms of demand shocks, then the knowledge of correlation structure
leads to perfect monitoring and so the temptation of rms to deviate is reduced and so is the frequency
of price wars.
[Case 2] Assume "1 and "2 are perfectly and positively correlated.
If rms enter into a punishment phase when they observe low prot in any of the two markets, rms
can sustain collusion if
2H + 2L
2
+ 
VP + VC
2
 2(H + k) + 2L
2
+ VP
Then, with the optimal punishment, VC =
H+L k
1  (and VP = VC   2k), which is exactly the same
as in the benchmark case (note that VC in the benchmark case is for a single market and so should be
doubled for comparison). That is, the value of collusion remains the same with and without linking the
markets because there is no risk of contagion.
Moreover, the knowledge of correlation structure does not a¤ect collusion either because one more
market is only a replication of the same market, meaning no additional information that rms can take
advantage of. Therefore, MMC is irrelevant in this case.
[Case 3] Assume "1 and "2 are independent of each other.
If rms trigger retaliations in the both markets if it observes low prot in at least one of the markets
and a cheating rm optimally deviates in the both markets, collusion is sustainable if
2H + 2L + (H +L) + (L +H)
4
+ 
VC + 3VP
4
 2(H + k) + 2L + ((H + k) + L) + (L + (H + k))
4
+ VP
Then, with the optimal punishment, VC =
H+L k
1 =2 (and VP =
1
3(VC   4k)), which is less that the
value of collusion in the benchmark case (= H+L k1  ). The reduction in the value of collusion is because
of the risk of contagion which increases the type I error that a rm erroneously accuses low prot of
cheating and enters into a punishment phase.
However, if rms know how demand shocks are correlated between the markets, they can adjust a
trigger strategy optimally. First of all, for each possible pair of prots of an innocent rm in the two
markets, the change in probability is
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Pr f(1;2)jDg   Pr f(1;2)jCg
=
0  :25 =  :25 if (1;2) = (L;H), (H ;L), or (H ;H)
1  :25 = :75 if (1;2) = (L;L)
So, the biggest change in probability occurs for the case where prot is low in every market, i.e.
(L;L). Based on this, consider the trigger strategy that a rm will retaliate in the both markets if it
observed low prots in the both markets. Under this strategy, collusion is sustainable if
2H + 2L + (H +L) + (L +H)
4
+ 
3VC + VP
4
 2(H + k) + 2L + ((H + k) + L) + (L + (H + k))
4
+ VP
With the optimal punishment that satises the incentive constraint with an exact equality, the value
of collusion is VC =
H+L k=3
1  (and VP = VC  43k). We can see that the value of collusion is larger with
this trigger strategy than with a simple trigger strategy that triggers punishment when a rm observes
low prot in at least one market because the risk of contagion becomes large when the latter strategy is
chosen. The value of collusion is actually even larger than in the benchmark case where the markets are
taken separately (= H+L k1  ).
However, a cheating rm might want to deviate in one market at random rather than in the both
markets because it will reduce the probability of getting caught. Then, for each possible pair of prots of
an innocent rm in the two markets, the change in probability is
Pr f(1;2)jDg   Pr f(1;2)jCg =
:25  :25 = 0 if (1;2) = (H ;L) or (L;H)
0  :25 =  :25 if (1;2) = (H ;H)
:5  :25 = :25 if (1;2) = (L;L)
The probability changes the most for (L;L). Again, the optimal trigger event would be (L;L),
i.e. entering into a punishment phase if low prot is realized in the both market. In this case, the incentive
constraint not to deviate becomes
H +L + 
3VC + VP
4
 ((H + k) + H) + 2L + ((H + k) + L) + (L +H)
2
+ 
VP + VC
2
In this case, with the optimal punishment, VC =
H+L k=2
1  (and VP = VC   2k). Note that rms
cannot sustain collusion with the optimal punishment level when a rm expects that a cheating rm will
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deviate in every market (VP =
H+L k=3
1    43k) because a rm will be tempted to deviate in only one
market, with less immediate gain but less probability of getting caught. Therefore, the optimal trigger
event is that a rm observes low prot in the both markets and, once punishment is triggered, the highest
value that the rms can get in a punishment phase will be VP =
H+L k=2
1    2k. Still, the value of
collusion, H+L k=21  is higher than in the benchmark case.
Table 2.2. Value of Collusion (Vc) under Unobservable Demand Shocks
Separating Linking
Trigger Strategy Benchmark Case 1 Case 3 Case 2
( =  1) ( =  1) ( =  1)
Simple
MH +
M
L  k
1 
MH +
M
L  k
1 =2 No level of Vc sustainable
MH +
M
L  k
1 
Optimal
MH +
M
L  k
1 
MH +
M
L  k=2
1 
MH +
M
L
1 
Optimal strategy refers to the strategy in which rms.
Table 2.2 summarizes the results in this section. A separating strategy means that a trigger strategy
and punishment is determined in a market separately. In contrast, a linking strategy means that a trigger
strategy and punishment is determined, based on the outcomes in every overlapping market. On the
other hand, there could be two types of strategies when linking markets; a simple strategy that a rm
triggers punishment if a rm observes low prot in at least one market and an optimal strategy that a
rm enters into punishment phase if a rm observes the market outcome that is much more likely when
other rms cheated than when other rms were collusive (in this basic model, the optimal strategy is to
trigger punishment if a rm observes low prot in the both markets).
The rst row of the value of collusion in Table 2.2 shows that the risk of contagion becomes more serious
as the overlapping markets get more diversied ( is the largest for perfectly and positively correlated
demand shocks, followed by independent shocks, and the least for perfectly and negatively correlated
shocks). However, once we assume that rms know the correlation structure of demand shocks between
the overlapping markets, then the simple trigger strategy is not optimal and they can specify a better
trigger strategy that incorporates the information. That is, the knowledge of the correlation structure of
demand shocks between the overlapping markets can improve monitoring, which not only o¤sets the risk
of contagion but also may increase the value of collusion. In particular, under better monitoring, rms
may not protably deviate in every market and thus the gains from deviation decreases while the future
loss from deviation remains the same. This will curb the temptation to deviate and facilitate collusion.
Moreover, the informational advantage from linking markets becomes larger as the overlapping markets
get more diversied.
In conclusion, even in the markets where demand shocks are unobservable, MMC may facilitate
collusion if the markets are diversied and rms are aware of how demand shocks are correlated between
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the markets. This is because, although the reduction in demand uctuations from diversication makes
collusion even harder, if rms know the correlation structure of demands shocks between the markets they
are meeting, they optimally adjust a trigger strategy that prevents the risk of contagion and furthermore
improves the value of collusion. That is, the informational advantage of observing the distribution of
outcomes of the diversied may exceed the risk of contagion of linking the diversied markets. So, we can
conclude that MMC may help collusion through diversication even when demand shock is unobservable.
In addition, the conditional probability is even more precise than the joint probability when in comes
to inferring a rival rms action in the market with unobservable demand shocks. In this sense, there is
an advantage for a rm in diversifying to the industry where a rival rm is operating and demand shock is
observable if it is currently meeting with the rival rm in the industry with unobservable demand shock.
4 Extension
So far, I have focused on the incentive not to deviate in the period of high demand given that rms
can coordinate their actions if they want. However, explicit communication of price is mostly illegal and
coordination of actions itself might be hard to begin with. In some industries, rms might nd coordination
rather easy even without explicit discussion of pricing. For example, rms might have been operating
in the same market for a long time and managers and practitioners know each other, even personally.
Or, the advanced internet technology might enhance the communication between rms through the third
party that posts some information that signals rmsactions. In these industries, the incentive to deviate
is the concern for rms participating in collusion and the theory above applies.
However, when it comes to what will actually happen after cheating, the easiness of coordinating
actions might rather undermine collusion because of possible renegotiation. First of all, the Folk Theorem
asserts that basically any collusive outcome can be implemented in innitely repeated game as long as it is
feasible and individually rational, i.e. subgame-perfect, which is sometime called as the embarrassment
of riches. As a mean to narrow down a set of subgame perfect equilibria, credibility of equilibrium
has been presented by Farrell and Maskin (1989), which is called as (Weak) Renegotiation-Proofness.
Basically, if not only a cheating rm but also an innocent rm can be better o¤ by restarting collusion
rather than implementing punishments, they will have an incentive to renegotiate. Especially, the only
credible equilibrium in the symmetric Bertrand price competition without capacity constraints is the
Bertrand Nash Equilibrium, meaning perfect competition and no collusion. Therefore, if renegotiation is
possible after deviation, collusion may be simply impossible even with a high discount factor when rms
are competing with price and homogeneous products.
Recall that, when demand shock is observable, rms are more tempted to deviate in the period of high
demand and MMC may be able to alleviate this problem through diversication and thereby improves
collusive prots. However, if a discount factor is high enough, the incentive constraint is not binding and
any collusive outcome can be implemented even without MMC. In contrast, if renegotiation is possible,
any collusive outcome might be unsustainable in the rst place.
In order to account for the two problems regarding a high discount factor and renegotiation, I modify
the general game theoretic approach by introducing a rms belief in whether there is a rm that has a
nite time horizon and how short the time horizon would be. I further assume that rms adjust their
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beliefs based on current market outcomes when deciding whether to continue the collusive behavior in
the next period.
If a rm has a nite time horizon and other rms are not aware of it, the rm will deviate at the
end. Firms can have nite time horizon due to various reasons, e.g. managers may serve only a nite
term, or the wage structure is based on short-term performances, or rms may face cash constraints in
any moment. Short-term oriented managers will put more weight on today and the future will become
more and more negligible. Also, nancially constrained rms are likely to trigger a price war regardless
of whether cheating has taken place, as noted by Busse (2002) that airlines under nancial distress are
more likely to lead a price war.
I assume that rms rationally expect that other rms might have nite time horizon and end up with
deviation in the next period. In particular, rms have a prior belief that there is a rm that will deviate
in the next period because of a nite time horizon with probability  2 [0; 1]. For example, if there are
N identical rms in a market, in a traditional game theoretical approach, the incentive constraint for a
rm not to deviate is
N <

1   (= + + 
2+    )
where  is a payo¤ to a participating rm from collusion and  is a discount factor. If we incorporate 
into this model, the incentive constraint now becomes
N <
(1  )
1    (= (1  ) + (1  ) + 
2(1  ) +    )
because a rm might end up being cheated by other rm with nite time horizon with probability 
in every period in the future. In other words, since rms believe that collusion can continue only with
probability 1   , the expected payo¤ for a participating rm in each period is now only (1   ). If
 = 0, it goes back to the traditional game theoretic model. On the other hand, positive has the same
e¤ect as the decrease in the discount factor in the incentive constraints for rms not to deviate. In other
words, positive  discounts the future prot that will be lost if a rm defects and thus makes collusion
harder. As a result, the possible set of collusion equilibria shrinks.
In addition, assume that the belief is a function of market outcome; a rm has a prior belief  =
0 2 (0; 1) until any one deviates (if demand shock is observable) or it observes a certain prot level
that triggers punishment (if demand shock is unobservable), and, once those trigger events take place,
the belief  is adjusted to one for good because the rm now knows that some rms do have nite time
horizon. Notice that, once the belief is adjusted after the trigger events, any level of collusion is no
longer sustainable. As I assume this adjustment of the belief based on market outcome, there becomes no
dynamic inconsistency of incentives before and after cheating and thus renegotiation will not take place.
Now, if I incorporate the belief , which is a function of whether or not trigger events have taken place,
to the basic models with unobservable/observable demand shocks, then the collusion will become harder
to sustain and the equilibrium is renegotiation-free. However, the key conclusion will remain the same
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that MMC may facilitate collusion and, if demand shock is observable, the e¤ect will be more signicant
especially in the period of high demand.
5 Conclusion
In this study, I explored how collusive outcome is a¤ected by MMC and diversication when the com-
peting rms face stochastic demand shocks. I consider two kinds of demand shocks depending on their
observability.
First of all, when demand shock is observable, Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) pointed out that rms
are more tempted to deviate from collusion in the period of high demand (because the immediate gain
from deviation increases while the expected future loss from it remains the same). In this case, unless
the demand shocks are perfectly and positively correlated across overlapping markets, the incentive to
deviate in the period of high demand will decrease. Given that overlapping markets are strategically
linked in the sense that a deviation in a single market will trigger retaliations in all markets, a rm will
optimally deviate in every market once it decides to cheat, and then the best opportunity to deviate
is when demand is high in every overlapping market. If the linked markets are diversied, however,
when demand is high in some markets, demand will be not-so-high in other markets, meaning that the
immediate gain from deviation is reduced and so is the temptation to deviate. (That is, the probability
that demand is high in every market will decrease with the number of overlapping markets.) In this sense,
MMC and diversication of demand shocks by linking the markets will facilitate collusion by reducing
the temptation to deviate in the period of high demand.
Now, lets turn to the case of unobservable demand shocks. In this case, the implication of MMC
and diversication may be di¤erent as monitoring is imperfect. The negative link between imperfect
monitoring and collusion has been noted by Green and Porter (1984). With unobservable demand shock,
detection of cheating is not perfect as, when a rm observes a prot below a certain level, it cannot tell
negative demand shock from secrete cheating by other rms. So, a price war is triggered not only by
cheating but also by low demand. This price war is costly but necessary to sustain collusion. In this
case, MMC facilitate collusion by improving monitoring ability and by reducing the frequency of costly
punishment on the equilibrium path. We need to note that there can be two opposite e¤ects of MMC
on collusion. First, in the sense that low demand in a local market may falsely trigger a price war in
all overlapping markets, MMC may have negative impact on expected collusive prots. However, MMC
may improve rmsmonitoring ability as rms now can use the information on the joint distribution of
market outcomes across overlapping markets, in addition to individual market outcome, in order to infer
other rmsactions. That is, rms will optimally adjust trigger events so that they will enter into the
punishment phase if the prole of prots across the markets becomes much more likely when cheating has
occurred than when other rms have been cooperative. One of the optimal trigger events can come from
the Likelihood Ratio test in the Maximum Likelihood Estimation. (Although a single market outcome
may not have any information about other rmsactions, the joint distribution of outcomes across the
overlapping markets may be informative.). Using this trigger strategy, I showed that MMC can improve
collusive prots if rms optimally adjust punishment trigger event based on the information about the
joint distribution of demand shocks.
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The previous empirical works on the topic have examined either the decrease in rivalry associated
with MMC on average or the e¤ect of heterogeneity in markets or rms on the link between MMC
and competition. This study provides a new testable implication on the topic, which is about a dynamic
relationship between MMC and price competition. When demand shock is observable, the theory predicts
that price competition will be muted by MMC in the period of high demand. The test of this idea will
be an interesting future research.
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